Water warfare: India’s dominance and Pakistan’s options

India and Pakistan have been enemies since the birth of the two countries, and recent events seem to have given the former an upper hand in pushing the latter into a corner. After the deadly militant attack in India-administered Kashmir's Pahalgam on 22 April, India blamed Pakistan for the attack without any evidence.
Pakistan categorically denied involvement in the attack. But disregarding that, the Modi government then suspended the 1960 Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan, which had endured through numerous past conflicts.
Indian Prime Minister Modi said on 6 May that "now, India's water will flow for India's benefit, it will be conserved for India's benefit, and it will be used for India's progress."
The stakes for Pakistan in 'water politics'
This raises a serious concern for Pakistan. How will Pakistan deal with this "water politics" amid global climate change? Will India act according to international laws, or will the Modi government use this tool to entrench their hold on power?
Pakistan is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world. Almost 90 per cent of its agriculture and economy depend on the Indus river system. As a transboundary river, the Indus water had become the metaphorical rope in a tug of war between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
In 1960, the IMF mediated the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan, making it a rare success in bilateral relations.
India has previously attempted to withdraw from the IWT multiple times. According to a BBC report from 2017, Indian media suggested that Delhi might walk away from the Indus Water Treaty following the Amarnath Yatra attack in India-administered Kashmir.
The Pahalgam attack in April was also near the route used for the Amarnath Yatra, a sacred pilgrimage of the Hindu community.
India's treaty suspension: A diplomatic flashpoint
The Modi government showed a disregard for international law by suspending the treaty. Pakistan has characterised India's action as an act of war, indicating its readiness to retaliate with "full force" against any disruption of the water supply.
Options for Pakistan: War or diplomacy?
The question now is, what would Pakistan do in reality? Will Pakistan take this matter to an international court or launch a full-scale war against India?
The reality seems to be that there is very little chance of conflict. Pakistan cannot afford to start a full-scale conflict over water. Both nuclear-armed states run the risk of unchecked escalation in a conventional conflict, particularly one involving water. Another argument is that an extended conflict is too much for Pakistan's struggling economy to handle.
So, the realistic solution is to take legal and diplomatic action. Previously, Pakistan successfully employed this to challenge India's Kishanganga and Ratle dams. In the case of IWT, Article IX of the treaty states that any legal disagreements (interpretation/application) must be addressed before an arbitration court. And if India violates the IWT as a whole (rather than just specific projects), which is the current situation, Pakistan could claim a "material breach" of an international treaty (under Vienna Convention norms) and seek ICJ intervention if India agrees, or it could request an advisory opinion from the UN General Assembly.
India's Regional Water Disputes Go Beyond Pakistan
It would be naive to believe that the present Modi government wants to settle this disagreement gently. India's water politics harm not only the Indus River system in Pakistan but also the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta in Bangladesh. Nepal also accuses India of unilateral dam construction, which has caused flooding. So India's water problems are more than just bilateral; they are part of a larger regional water security challenge.
Is India trying to dominate South Asia?
In the post-Cold War world, water became the new frontier. Since 2014, the BJP-led Modi government has held power. The RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), the BJP's ideological guardian, is a far-right Hindu nationalist organisation with a long-held desire for an 'Akhand Bharat', or undivided India. Some fear that India may use hydropower to influence the sociopolitical issues of its neighbours.
In this regard, the question is whether Pakistan and other South Asian countries revive the SAARC or establish a new alliance to prevent India from becoming the "big brother" of this region. Another aspect to consider is how China would intervene in this matter, both as an upstream country and in its hunger to become the next great power.
Should Bangladesh be concerned?
Bangladesh is likewise concerned about Indian 'water politics'. The Farakka Barrage, located in India's state of West Bengal, has wreaked havoc on the South-West Bangladesh ecology.
After extensive diplomatic discussions, the Indian and Bangladeshi governments reached an agreement in the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty for the next 25 years, which expires in 2026. Bangladeshi authorities have little hope based on their previous experience with Indian authorities' reluctance and stubbornness in the planned Teesta water pact.
Furthermore, bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh have deteriorated since the July revolution brought down the Hasina regime, which had close ties with the Modi regime. It may raise issues about whether India will extend the Ganges Treaty or halt it.
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